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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether differential treatment of men and women in the labor market
is due to unobservable differences in productivity or if it is motivated by a taste for discrimi-
nation. While studies on sex-discrimination typically control for human capital (formal edu-
cation, job-experience etc.), there is usually no information on personality traits available.
We argue that personality might affect productivity just as human capital: For many
traditionally male occupations (e.g. managers) stereotypically masculine characteristics – like
being ambitious, competitive, dominant – seem to be required. On the other hand, stereotypi-
cally feminine characteristics – like being gentle, cheerful, friendly – are particularly ac-
knowledged in traditionally female occupations (e.g. nurses). The central question of this pa-
per is whether women are treated differently because “they are different” (they posses more
“feminine” and less“masculine” personality traits on the average) or because they are dis-
criminated against.
To gather the necessary data a field experiment is conducted. Job applications of can-
didates, who are equivalent in their human capital but differ in sex and personality are sent out
in response to various job advertisements.
We found minor indicators that signaling a masculine personality slightly reduces un-
favorable treatment of women in typically male professions; nevertheless discrimination in
hiring prevails even after controlling for personality characteristics.
Keywords: Sex-Discrimination, Matching Process, Experimental Economics, Economic Psy-
chology
JEL-Code: C93, J16, J70, J24, J423
1 Introduction
There is a large number of studies investigating sex-discrimination in the labor market. One
common approach to test for discrimination is through a wage decomposition
1, that combines
the estimated coefficients for male wages and the values of the explanatory variables for
women (education, job-experience etc.). The difference to what women actually do earn in the
labor market is assigned to discrimination. A disadvantage of this method is that it gives “no
conclusive proof of discrimination as long as all other possible relevant variables have not
been identified” (Bovenkerk, 1992, p. 4) because wage differentials might be driven by unob-
servable productivity differences.
Firth (1982) and Riach/Rich (1995) measured sex-discrimination via an experimental
technique called Correspondence Testing. Although they adopted an undeniably very appeal-
ing methodology previously used for race-discrimination, they did not manage to exploit a
particular advantage of experimental investigation: the possibility to include usually unob-
servable characteristics and test whether these can explain differences in labor market out-
comes of men and women. Instead, they focused exclusively on individual characteristics like
formal education and job-experience, which are typically available for wage-regressions and
wage-decompositions respectively. As Heckman (1998) has noted, experiments of this kind
do not provide new insights, since differential treatment might be due to differences in indi-
vidual characteristics that have not been controlled for.
This paper goes one step further than previous experimental studies by adopting Cor-
respondence Testing to investigate the impact of usually unobservable variables. When test-
ing for discrimination it may not be sufficient to control for human capital only. In many at-
tractive, high paid jobs specific personality traits seem to be particularly successful, which are
more commonly associated with men than with women in general. For example, a successful
manager is supposed to be ambitious, competitive and dominant, which are stereotypically
masculine traits. On the other hand, in many traditionally female occupations stereotypically
feminine characteristics are preferred. For example, a good nurse or kindergarten teacher
seems to require feminine characteristics like being gentle, cheerful and friendly. So apart
from human capital, personality might affect productivity just as well! Consequently when
testing for discrimination, one would also want to control for personality besides typical hu-4
man capital variables to have complete information on all productive characteristics of an
employee.
This paper investigates whether women have less access to attractive, traditionally
male jobs because their sex-stereotypical personality does not fit. If women as a group are
assumed not to possess the required characteristics for a male occupation, they will not be
hired for such jobs. In this study we contrast the labor outcomes of a woman who can not be
mistaken for lacking the required masculine characteristics with those of a traditional female.
If a woman can demonstrate that she does not correspond to her sex-stereotype and in fact
does have the stereotypical personality traits of a man, she should be treated like him. A
woman with identical human capital and personality should be equally productive as a man –
there are no other variables conceivable that might determine productivity apart from knowl-
edge and personality traits. Consequently, she should receive equal treatment. If such an equal
treatment is not observable, we argue, discrimination has been documented.
To gain the necessary data an experiment is conducted. The labor market outcomes of
three hypothetical job applicants with identical human capital are compared. One man and
two women, the latter differing in their perceived gender role, are applying for the same jobs.
One of the women is perceived as stereotypically feminine, the other masculine. The goal is to
investigate, whether it is sex or personality what determines women’s unfavorable position in
the labor market. We find that even when controlling for personality discrimination prevails
in the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section elaborates the theoretical back-
ground of the study, section three describes the design of the experiment, results are presented
in section four and further discussed in the concluding section five.
                                                                                                                                                  
1 See Altonji/Blank (1999) for a survey.6
not only discrimination, but unobserved group differences in productivity as well.
3 Since it is
not possible to distinguish between these two components, wage decomposition does not al-
low one to test for discrimination directly.
As a result it has been argued (e.g. by Altonji and Blank, 1999), that experimental
techniques could examine more directly, whether labor market discrimination exists. Experi-
mental methods to measure discrimination typically focus on the hiring process instead of
earnings and follow one simple procedure: The labor market outcomes of matched individu-
als, who possess “identical productive characteristics” but come from different demographic
groups, are compared. If the two are matched in all conceivable productive characteristics but
are not equally successful, this can be assigned to discrimination according to above defini-
tion.
Although very appealing, this technique - as Heckman (1998) has pointed out - is
likewise unable to prove discrimination if the experimental design has not been carefully
elaborated. Heckman points out the difficulty to control for all possibly relevant productive
characteristics. In the framework of the experiment this means that the tested employer is not
provided with sufficient information on all relevant variables. If information on one variable
is lacking, employers have to form expectations: When men are on average better than women
in this dimension and no individuating information is available, then a man will be hired be-
cause his expected total productivity is higher. This argument follows the general idea of sta-
tistical discrimination, developed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), which posits that under
conditions of incomplete information or uncertainty, individuals are judged on the basis of
beliefs about group averages. Note that statistical discrimination is not regarded to be dis-
crimination according to above definition because workers do not have identical productive
characteristics on the average and employers only make profit-maximizing decisions under
uncertainty – solely driven by productivity considerations but not discriminatory tastes.
In contrast to earlier experimental investigations this paper considers the often stated
concern that convincing evidence for discrimination is still missing and that it may not only
be human capital variables, like schooling and experience, that determine the productivity of
an individual. We argue that if it is not only human capital, it must be personality that affects
productivity as a second component. Many researchers, e.g. Schein (1973), have emphasized,
that different personality traits are considered successful in different occupations. Conse-
quently if an experiment does not only control for schooling and job-experience but for per-
                                               
3 Note that in fact the first term of equation (1.2) can be affected by discrimination too: pre-market discrimina-
tion can have a strong effect e.g. on the human capital of individuals.7
sonality as well, there will be little room left for statistical discrimination. After all, what
could influence productivity apart from human capital and personality variables?
The goal of this study is to conduct an experiment where applicants are not only
matched in human capital but also in personality traits. If differential treatment remains, then
it really can be assigned to discrimination, since all relevant characteristics have been con-
trolled for. In the following section the mechanism how personality traits affect the hiring
process is discussed in detail.
2.2 Personality and the matching process
2.2.1 Categorization of personality traits by gender
Although the words sex and gender are often used interchangeably, they actually have distinct
meanings. While sex refers to the biological state of being male or female, gender points to
stereotypical roles and personality traits assigned to men and women by society.
Stereotypical characteristics are generally attributed to groups of people with certain
observable demographic features (e.g. biological sex or ethnic background) to structure com-
plex data and to simplify the cognitive processing of information (Heilman, 1995).
Table 1 gives an overview of sex-stereotyped traits that constitute gender. Believes
about the nature of the typical man and woman serve as indicators for masculinity and femi-
ninity. Generally, it can be said that men are considered task-oriented and active while women
are perceived as emotional and expressive. A “typical man” is regarded to be ambitious, ana-
lytical and assertive, while a “typical woman” is deemed affectionate, cheerful and child-
loving.
The problem about stereotyping is twofold: On the one hand stereotypes give rise to
the belief that all individuals within a social category can be viewed as the same, which ne-
glects the heterogeneity within the group. On the other hand there is much skepticism that
sex-stereotypes actually reflect reality even on the average. In fact clear evidence on the em-
pirical value of sex-stereotypes is lacking.
4 For these two reasons sex-stereotypes are not per-
fect predictors for individuals’ personality traits: A man can be very child-loving and under-
standing (feminine), while a woman can be assertive and competitive (masculine). That
means that one’s gender does not have to match one’s sex and biological sex does not deter-8
mine gender.
5 Instead, all combinations of sex (male and female) and gender (masculine and
feminine) are conceivable. This is crucial to the study.
                     Masculine personality traits Feminine  personality traits












Eager to soothe hurt feelings
Gentle
Loves children
Sensitive to the needs of others
Sympathetic
Understanding
Table 1: Sex-stereotyped traits constituting gender. Selected items from the Bem Sex-Role Inventory
(BSRI) for measuring psychological gender identity (Bem, 1974).
6
2.2.2 Categorization of occupations by their sex-types
Just as individuals are categorized by their sex and gender role, occupations can be distin-
guished by their sex-type. Economists call an occupation “feminine” when the large majority
of employees is female.
7 Some psychologists stress an additional inherent characteristic of
normative belief that reflect such unequal proportions as “how it should be”. (Merton in
Schein, 1973, p. 95)
There is clear evidence for horizontal and vertical segregation in Austria like most
western countries. The segregation index for the year 1993 is 56 % (Weichselbaumer 1999,
p. 71), which means that 56 % of women (or men) would have to change occupations, so that
an identical distribution of sexes could be achieved. Traditionally female occupations are pri-
marily caring and cleaning jobs (e.g. cleaning personnel, hairdressers, housekeepers, nurses,
                                                                                                                                                  
4 For a review of studies testing the empirical value of sex stereotypes see e.g. Heilman (1995).
5 Feminist scholars e.g. in philosophy and rhetorics understand gender as a performative act constituted through
„doing“ or „enacting gender“. (Butler, 1990; Ussher, 1997)
6 Out of approximately 200 human traits Bem extracted those, that were considered as differently socially desir-
able for men and women. The BSRI consists of 20 „feminine“ and „masculine“ characteristics each - supple-
mented by 20 „neutral“ characteristics - considered as equally socially desirable for men and women. In Bem’s
understanding femininity and masculinity constitute two independent dimensions and not opposites on a bipolar
continuum – therefore an individual can score high in masculine and in feminine characteristics at the same time.
If a person is equipped with approximately similar amounts of feminine and masculine traits, he or she is called
“androgynous” according to Bem.
7 The cut-off point is usually drawn at the proportion of one sex of 70 % or 80 %. (Wootton, 1997, p. 19).9
textile workers, welfare workers) while traditionally male occupations are often characterized
by the use of physical labor or financial/political power (e.g. electricians, mechanics, archi-
tects, lawyers, politicians, managers).
Since some of the best paid jobs (architects, lawyers, managers) can be found within the
second category, the question arises, why women tend to be clustered in unattractive, low paid
occupations with little career opportunities, while the more attractive ones seem to be re-
served for men.
Certainly sex-discrimination can be one reason for the sex-segregation we observe in
the labor market, but there is a number of other relevant factors as well. For example, differ-
ences in human capital and in preferences for work characteristics (work environment, flexi-
ble hours, compatibility with family obligations etc.) crucially affect one’s productivity and
suitability for a job.
In this study an elaborate experimental design allows to isolate the role of discrimina-
tion in sex-segregation while holding all other factors constant.
2.2.3 The role of personality traits in the hiring process
While standard economic theory often supposes that solely the matching of the human capital
required for a job with the education and job-experience of an applicant is relevant in the hir-
ing process, psychological literature can challenge our thinking.
A number of psychologists (e.g. Heilman, 1984; Riehle, 1995) have emphasized, that
one factor determining who is hired for a job is “the degree of congruence between the gender
of the applicant and the sex type of the job” (Glick et al., 1988, p. 178). For example Schein
(1973) documented in her much cited paper, that managers (holders of a traditionally mascu-
line job) believe that to be successful in their occupation it takes more of those characteristics
typically ascribed to men than to women in general.
While in traditionally male occupations (such as management) employees are expected
to obtain traditionally masculine characteristics (e.g. being ambitious, analytical, assertive,
dominant), the requirements for traditional female jobs seem to be very different. Hiring an
assertive person as a nurse is usually not considered a promising choice; the ideal employee
for such a position is regarded to be sensitive, sympathetic and gentle – in short: feminine.
We infer from this, that not only human capital but as well matching personality traits
increase workers’ productivity at a job.10
Situation of incomplete information
When personality is taken into account and a vacant position has to be filled, productivity of
an applicant can not be predicted with certainty, because the employer faces incomplete in-
formation on two ends: Not only does she often miss reliable information about which per-
sonality traits are productive on a job and has to use stereotypes to infer from instead.
8 The
personality traits of applicants are usually not even observable at the point of hiring. While it
is possible to achieve knowledge on the productivity of certain personality traits in particular
occupations in the long run, the lack of information about an individual applicant is a more
severe problem leading to statistical discrimination. To form expectations about their potential
future employees, entrepreneurs will make use of observable characteristics such as biological
sex (or race) that are assumed to correlate with the unobservable variables. This means em-
ployers draw on sex-stereotypes to predict the productivity of an applicant on the job. Conse-
quently a randomly chosen biological woman will be expected to have more feminine and less
masculine characteristics than a randomly chosen man.
9 As Heilman has stated in her Lack of
Fit Model (1983), this leads to the fact that under incomplete information women are per-
ceived as less suitable for typically better paying male jobs, although there are many individ-
ual women who possess the required male characteristics.
Since formal education and to some degree job experience is often observable to an
employer by means of school reports and CV, the important contribution by Heilman to the
theory of statistical discrimination is that personality characteristics could be one decisive
unobservable factor that affects productivity and actually does need to be estimated. While all
formal qualifications can be tested more easily, personality traits are difficult to evaluate. This
might therefore be the crucial factor driving statistical discrimination against women.
Let us shortly summarize the matching process when the importance of personality traits and
the effect of imperfect information is taken into account. In an occupation with a large major-
ity of men as employees, masculine characteristics are usually perceived as successful. If can-
                                               
8 Chiplin and Sloane (1976) have argued, that usually personality characteristics of previous job-holders (being
white, male, middle-aged) are considered “successful”, while in fact they do not necessarily have to be produc-
tivity relevant.
9 One might presume, that incorrect „stereotypes“ will be revised through Bayesian updating in the long run just
as incorrect beliefs.  This is conditional on the fact that members of the incorrectly assessed group have a chance
of proving their “true nature” and do not adapt to the stereotype. But women confronted with sex-stereotypes
might have an incentive to behave in socially more rewarded feminine ways, which means that stereotypes have
a self-enforcing character. As a result no objective assessment of real and stable traits can take place.11
didates are equivalent in formal qualification (e.g. schooling, experience), the appropriate
personality of the applicants becomes crucial. If there is no individuating information on per-
sonality traits, the biological sex is used as an indicator to infer from. An average man is pre-
sumed to be more likely to possess the required masculine characteristics and therefore - eve-
rything else equal – receives preferential treatment.
A number of studies (Cohen/Bunker, 1975; Rosen/Jerdee, 1974; Cash et al., 1977)
have documented, by means of laboratory experiments, that the described matching between
sex-stereotype and sex-type of a job is taking place: Equally qualified women are more suc-
cessful applying for traditional feminine jobs, and men in masculine jobs.
10
Situation of complete information
The need to make use of stereotypes only exists in a situation of incomplete information. If
individuals have features that clearly distinguish them from their stereotype, their difference
from the stereotype is well recognized.
11 So when a woman, who is seeking a male position,
can give individuating information that she does not correspond to traditional sex-stereotypes,
she should face better chances of actually getting the job. Laboratory studies (Glick et al.,
1988; Dipboye/Wiley, 1977; Heilman/Saruwatari, 1979) and an ex-post evaluation of hiring
decisions (Van Vianen/Willemsen, 1992) have supported the hypothesis that appearing mas-
culine increases women’s chances to be hired in a masculine occupation. This lets us presume
that in traditionally masculine occupations there is a positive effect from masculinity which is
due to a reduction of statistical discrimination.
Violation of one’s stereotypical sex-role
While signaling a masculine gender identity reduces uncertainty about an applicant’s person-
ality and thereby statistical discrimination, there is an antagonistic effect conceivable at the
                                               
10 The results of an audit study by Neumark et al. (1996) could be interpreted along similar lines. They found
that men were more successful applying as waiters for high-price restaurants, while women received more job
offers at low-price ones. It is most likely, that the different sex types of the jobs were responsible for this out-
come. Levinson (1975) conducted another field experiment, where equally qualified male and female students
applied for masculine and feminine jobs. It was found that women suffered clear-cut discrimination in 28 %
when applying for a masculine job, while men’s chances for an out-of-role job were even lower – they were
clearly discriminated in 44 % of the cases.
11 As Fiske et al. (1991, p. 1050) have emphasized: „Stereotyping is most likely when evaluative criteria are
ambiguous“ and „[the] most open to interpretation“.12
same time. A number of studies show that women who violate their gender role are less liked
and rated less favorably.
12 This could be described as a “distaste against masculine women” in
the sense of Becker’s “taste for discrimination”-model: Employers might not only have a dis-
taste against women in general, but even more so against women who violate traditional gen-
der roles.
The issue of interest in this study is, which of the two effects (i.e. reduction of statistical
discrimination on the one hand, increase of a taste for discrimination on the other) dominates
or if they cancel each other out. While it might be beneficial to signal masculine characteris-
tics since they are required for attractive male jobs, female masculinity could also evoke a
taste for discrimination. This dilemma that women are caught in has best been described by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the law case Hopkins vs. Price Waterhouse, where Ann Hopkins
was denied partnership, because she was considered too “macho” and little lady-like: “An
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait
places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch-22: out of a job if they behave ag-
gressively and out of a job if they do not.” (Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 295 in Case, 1995, p. 45)
2.2.4 Hypotheses
In the following we shall first assume that there is no discrimination (motivated by taste) and
that sex-stereotyped personality traits are productive. We have three types of candidates ap-
plying for a job: a male, a feminine female and a masculine female, all with the same human
capital. The male and the masculine female are equally assertive, competitive and dominant,
while the feminine female is more affectionate, cheerful and gentle. Who will be hired for
what kind of job?
In a situation of incomplete information, where gender identity is not observable, the
male will receive preferential treatment in a masculine job, while the two women will be
treated the same. This is because the employer can not distinguish between the two women.
Masculinity is highly valued in the job, but the masculine female cannot be identified as pro-
viding the required characteristics and suffers statistical discrimination. In a feminine job on
                                               
12 For example assertive women are less popular, women supporting equal rights are considered less likable and
feminists are rated less favorably than housewives. For a review of these studies see Riehle (1996). Laner and
Laner (1980) argue that one of the reasons why gays and lesbians are sometimes disliked, is due to the fact that
they more commonly violate traditional gender roles.13
the contrary, where feminine characteristics are required, the masculine female benefits from
statistical discrimination. Although in fact she would be less suited for the job, since she is
lacking the feminine characteristics, she will be treated like the feminine female, because the
employer just uses sex as an indicator for gender and expects both to have equivalent person-
ality traits. The two women will be more successfully applying for this job than the man.
What if the masculine female adopts visual and other cues to indicate her gender
identity? If she manages to give individuating information that distinguishes her from the
stereotypical woman, she should be treated like a man. After all she possesses the same mas-
culine characteristics as her male counterpart and can be identified as doing so. In such a
situation of complete information the masculine female and the man should be treated more
favorably than the feminine female in a masculine job, while in a feminine occupation the two
should be at a disadvantage against their feminine competitor.
If, on the contrary, the masculine female is treated differently than her male competi-
tor even though she has and reveals identical human capital and personality traits, this pattern
cannot be reconciled with statistical discrimination but only with a taste for discrimination.
3 Empirical Study
3.1 Methodology
As has been noted earlier, one common approach to test discrimination experimentally is to
contrast the experiences of one individual with those of another with identical characteristics,
when the two are only distinguishable by the different demographic groups they belong to. If
two individuals can be identified as identical apart from their sex or ethnic background, dif-
ferential treatment can be assigned to discrimination by definition. Experiments to measure
sex or race-discrimination
13 can be conducted in laboratory and real life settings. While psy-
                                               
13 In general similar experimental techniques can be used to investigate sex or race-discrimination. Novelist John
Howard Griffin conducted one of the first experiments to investigate race-discrimination: In 1960 he published
his book “Black Like Me” (Griffin, 1960), where he reported the experiences he encountered in America’s Deep
South after taking on an Afro-American look by using some skin-color device. 25 years later Günther Wallraff
repeated a similar experiment in Germany, when he adopted the looks and name of a Turkish citizen and summa-
rized his observations in his book “Ganz Unten” (Wallraff, 1988). Both of these reports documented unfavorable
treatment based on ethnic origin and had a big impact on public opinion, since an immediate comparison was
given: The treatment these writers received changed dramatically after they had manipulated only one variable:
their skin-color (and perceived ethnic background, respectively). Even though these two experiments were exe-
cuted by writers, the methodology is sound and similar techniques have been used for scientific purposes.14
chologists have a much longer tradition
14  in experimental investigation of sex-discrimination
than economists, they have usually restricted themselves to laboratory studies. Economists, on
the other hand, have conducted field experiments predominantly to examine race-discrimina-
tion
15.
One general drawback of previous experiments measuring sex-discrimination is that
testers usually have not been provided with sufficient information on all relevant productive
characteristics and had to form expectations as a result. Consequently, differential treatment
might have been due to statistical discrimination and not discrimination as has been claimed.
Laboratory Studies
The first widely cited laboratory experiment investigating the impact of sex on hiring deci-
sions was executed by Fidell (1970). She asked different psychology institutes to evaluate
hypothetical applicants who were described in a short written paragraph. The occupation in
question, the job of a department member in psychology, was a male dominated one. It was
found that when the candidate was given a female name, she was systematically offered a
lower position than a male. This study was repeated by various authors for different types of
occupations. A meta-study by Olian et al. (1988) over 19 experimental studies (from which 75
% of the examined occupations were traditionally masculine ones) found that men do receive
preferential treatment in hiring, but sex accounts for only 4 % of the variance and is – not sur-
prisingly – of far less importance than variables like education and experience.
Cohen and Bunker (1975), Rosen and Jerdee (1974), Cash et al. (1977) have carried
out similar laboratory studies investigating male and female dominated occupations to test
whether a matching of an applicant’s sex and sex-type of a job is taking place when a position
                                                                                                                                                  
But not only skin color has been artificially altered in the past: A number of historical records exist on
women, who for various reasons adopted male identities. Often a male identity gained them not only respect, but
access to jobs in masculine fields, that at times were the only ones which allowed them to financially self-
support themselves. Furthermore, it provided the possibility to travel. See Dekker/van de Pol, 1990; Wheel-
wright, 1990.
14 In 1968 Goldberg conducted his famous experiment, where he found that the same articles were received more
favorably when the author’s name indicated a male writer than when a female name was given. The result was,
however, significant only for those articles covering a traditionally masculine topic and for one of two dealing
with a gender-neutral issue. There was no significantly different treatment for authors who wrote on a feminine
topic. These results  – known as the Goldberg-paradigm – motivated a large body of research repeating the origi-
nal study. Swim (1989) conducted a metastudy over 123 experiments and found – contrary to the original result
– a negligible effect of sex in performance evaluation.
15 While there are only three experimental studies that examine sex-discrimination within economics (Firth,
1982; Riach/Rich, 1995; Neumark 1996), there is a large number of experiments investigating race-
discrimination in a whole range of different contexts (see, e.g. Firth, 1981; Yinger, 1986; Newman, 1978;
Riach/Rich, 1991b; Cross et al. 1990; Turner/Fix/Struyk, 1991; Kenney/Wissoker, 1994).15
has to be filled. Their results show that women equally qualified as men are preferred for tra-
ditionally female jobs and vice versa for male jobs. Gerdes and Garber (1983) as well as
Heilman (1984) argue that this pattern only holds true as long as there is some ambiguity
about the productivity of the applicants. If the candidates can clearly demonstrate to provide
the required characteristics and proof their previous success via a CV, then no stereotyping is
necessary and women are treated like their male competitors.
These results show that there is symmetrical, differential treatment of men and women
in applicant selection: Men receive preferential treatment in masculine and women in femi-
nine occupations. The last two authors suggest that this pattern is due to statistical discrimina-
tion though – i.e. due to the belief that, on average, women and men fit best into different
types of jobs – and not due to a taste for discrimination: If there are no doubts about an appli-
cant’s productivity, sex apparently does not matter.
An interesting result emerged from a study by Heilman and Saruwatari (1979) who
tested for the effects of physical beauty. Beauty increased men’s employment chances con-
sistently in all types of occupations. On the contrary, it proved to be an advantage for women
only in feminine occupations, while their employment opportunities in male occupations were
actually lowered. A covariance analysis showed that, in fact, it was the perceived gender
identity mediated by the physical looks of female applicants, that was driving the result: An
attractive woman was perceived as more feminine which increased her chances in a feminine
but reduced them in a masculine job in comparison to a less attractive female.
16
From this finding can be concluded, that gender as a set of personality traits plays a
role in the hiring process which has been postulated earlier.
Glick et al. (1988) have tried to examine the effect of gender on applicant selection via
an interesting laboratory study. By providing information on an applicant’s summer job, cam-
pus work-study job and extracurricular activity experiences, they attempted to indicate that
the applicant possessed either stereotypically masculine, sex-neutral, or feminine personality
traits. They found that masculinity increased women’s chances in male jobs, but could not
completely eliminate differential treatment. Since the information given in the experimental
material (resumé) was extremely brief, the possibility of mere statistical discrimination cannot
be dismissed though
17.
                                               
16 On the contrary, Marlowe et al. (1986) observed that women of low physical beauty received the worst treat-
ment of all applicants even in masculine jobs.
17 All information given in the resumés was that the applicant was a recent college graduate who financed 30 %
of his or her own education and a short list of activities.16
Results from laboratory studies obviously cannot be reliably transferred into real life.
In the laboratory the test person might be more supportive of women’s equal rights, not only
to give a socially desirable response, but also because the decision is “costless” - the test per-
son does not have to live with the consequences of  the own decision, i.e. does not have to
work with the chosen employee he actually dislikes. On the other hand there is a financial
motive in real life that does not exist in the laboratory: In real life the employer has a much
stronger financial interest to correctly evaluate the true productivity of a potential candidate,
and if he finds that the female is highly productive, he should hire her. On the contrary, the
incentive of evaluating the productivity in a laboratory situation without any financial reward
is rather low, which might lead to more traditional hiring recommendations.
Consequently, it is unclear in which direction real life results might deviate from labo-
ratory studies (if they do) and the goal of this study is to examine how employers evaluate
candidates of different sex and gender in real life settings for masculine and feminine jobs,
when provided with detailed information on personal characteristics (human capital, person-
ality), where statistical discrimination can be dismissed.
3.2 Field Experiment
Field experiments can either investigate whether equally qualified people of different demo-
graphic groups are discriminated in getting an interview (Correspondence Testing), or exam-
ine the entire hiring process (Audit Studies).
“Correspondence Testing”, the method used in this paper, was first applied in 1970 by
Jowell and Prescott-Clarke to measure race-discrimination (Riach/Rich, 1991b, p. 239) and
later adopted by Frith (1982) and Riach/Rich (1995) to examine sex-discrimination. The pro-
cedure is the following: Matched letters of applications are sent out in response to job adver-
tisements. The job seekers exhibit identical productive characteristics (e.g. age, qualification,
job-experience), but have a male and female name respectively. If all applicants are invited to
a job interview
18, this is interpreted as a case of equal treatment, if one applicant is invited but
                                               
18 Obviously testing whether somebody gets invited for an interview captures differential treatment at the initial
stage of hiring only, while some employers might delay their “discriminatory activity” until later. Still, the pos-
sibility to receive a job offer is conditional on being invited to an interview, which means that differential treat-
ment in hiring has to be equal or larger to what is measured by Correspondence Testing (Riach/Rich, 1995).
Researchers at the Urban Institute (e.g. Kenney/Wissoker, 1994) have extended this method to the next stage of
the hiring process: In their “Audit Studies” they have not only sent out written applications but also matched
pairs of real applicants of different ethnic groups who actually met employers for an interview. This allows to17
another is not, this is assigned to “discrimination”. Since both previous experiments have been
conducted in England and Australia, where relatively short résumés are common, the employ-
ers were not supplied with very detailed information about the candidates and might have
been forced to form expectations on the value of variables that have not been controlled for.
In particular there was no information on personality traits, so the significantly differential
treatment of men and women, that was found, might be due to statistical discrimination.
19 In
Austria, on the contrary, a more detailed set of documents is required to be considered a seri-
ous applicant. Consequently, this vast amount of information largely cancels out the possibil-
ity of statistical discrimination. Furthermore, in this study strong indicators for personality
traits were given, attempting to provide an entrepreneur with complete information in all rele-
vant dimensions.
3.2.1 Application material
To meet Austrian standards it was necessary to put together application material including not
only a letter of application but also an elaborate curriculum vitae, a fake school report and a
photograph. The failure to provide letters of references of previous employers did usually not
become evident since the fake applicants were still employed in their first job after a number
of years in most occupational types. Obviously the need to attach photographs of equally good
looking applicants made the preparation of the application material considerably more de-
manding, but also served as an advantage for the research question: Physical looks are one of
the clearest indicators for gendered personality traits and could be used as a signal accord-
ingly.
 To avoid any detection, names of employers were avoided in the CVs and job-
experience was formulated in a rather general way. All candidates applying for one particular
occupation had identical human capital and obtained their education in exactly the same
school-type only at different locations. The school marks in the attached school reports were
identical for all applicants in those subjects of primary relevance for the jobs under investiga-
tion and equal on average in subjects of lower interest. The photograph was attached in the
                                                                                                                                                  
observe discrimination in actual job-offers, although it suffers from the disadvantage that real life applicants
which meet all the required criteria are hard to find. Furthermore, it is impossible to control for differences in
real life interactions that might take place during an interview. Neumark et al. (1996) conducted the only small
scale study adopting this method to measure sex-discrimination in restaurant hiring.
19 While Frith (1982) only examined the market for accountants, Riach/Rich (1995) examined seven different
occupations in total. They found that two of the most masculine jobs (computer analyst and gardener) were also
those where women received significantly unfavorable treatment.18
form of a (digitally manipulated) image color-printed on the CV, which is a common cost-




Application material was created for three fake applicants: For one man and two women, the
latter differing in their perceived gender role. While all three applicants obtain identical hu-
man capital, the two women vary in their personality: One of them is constructed as a stereo-





 The different gender roles of the two female applicants were indicated by non-human-capital-
relevant items in the CV (e.g. hobbies, photograph), while all the human-capital- as well as
non-gender-relevant aspects that might influence the probability of being invited to an inter-
view (e.g. looks), were held constant.
 
 Indicators for gender identity  masculine  feminine
 Choice of font, layout  plain  nice, playful
 Hobbies  rock-climbing, canoeing, playing
drums, motorcycling
 drawing, designing and making
of clothes
 Physical looks
 (indicated through photographs)
 short, dark hair, broad shoulders,
business jacket
 long, blond hair; flowing clothes
 International experiences
21  motorcycle-tour through Australia for
one and a half years  (jobs in Perth,
Alice Springs, Melbourne, Darwin)
 stayed in Portland, USA, as an
au-pair girl for one and a half
years
Table 2: Indicators for female applicants‘ gender identity. (See Appendix: Indicators for gender identity
for details)
                                               
20 A number of reasons is responsible for our choice, that the gender identity of the male was not varied accord-
ingly. Firstly, the primary interest was whether sex-stereotypes put women in a unfavorable situation in the labor
market. The question whether men might be discriminated in feminine occupations seemed of less practical
importance, since these are typically less attractive and of lower pay. Secondly, a feminine looking man evokes
much more social rejection than a masculine women (Levinson, 1975). While there is some understanding that
women might „aspire“ to masculinity (since stereotypically masculine characteristics like strength and leadership
abilities are commonly perceived as more positive traits), this tolerance seems to be lacking when a man re-
nounces his male privileges to appear feminine. Last but not least „out-of-role“ males are more often perceived
as gay than out-of-role women as lesbian (McCreary, 1994). This association of gender and sexual identity
would have made it impossible to disentangle the discriminatory effects caused by the violation of stereotypical
gender and sexual orientation norms.
21 This information was only given for applicants in accounting, since they were of older age and consequently
the fact that all of them had international experiences was less striking.19
 
 The application materials allowed us to use criteria listed in Table 2 as indicators for
the two females’ gender identities. While the manliness of the masculine female was indicated
via her good but strikingly masculine looks, hobbies and style, the feminine applicant ap-
peared much more playful and traditionally feminine in her leisure time activities and looks.
3.2.2.2 Pretest: Bem Sex-Role Inventory
A pretest was conducted to verify the successful representation of the two females’ gender
identity and to ensure that the differences of all job-applicants in their self-presentation (in
particular by the photograph) did not cause distortions in general favorability.
119 business students with an average age of 24 years were asked to rate one applicant
each - represented by his or her CV - according to the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem,
1974), that provided a sufficient tool to test the dimensions „femininity“, „masculinity“, and
„social desirability“. Each of the three dimensions given by the BSRI consists of 20 items
which were evaluated on a 7-point scale.
Two items were important to be added to the social desirability dimension provided by
the BSRI: Beauty has repeatedly been shown to have major impacts on labor market decisions
(Biddle and Hammermesh, 1994, 1998; Averett and Korenman, 1996), similarly, “making a
competent impression” seemed important to include in the pretest as well to ensure that pho-
tographs and other variations in the CVs did not cause one applicant look relatively more pro-
ficient than others.
22
As Table 3 indicates, the two female applicants were rated differently in the dimen-
sions of masculinity and femininity, while the scores for social desirability are relatively
similar for all candidates.
Comparing the two females along the dimensions indicating gender identity, the femi-
nine female achieved significantly higher scores in femininity (the t-test allowing to reject the
H0 hypothesis of equal means at the 1 % level) and the masculine female in masculinity.
(Since the masculine female’s scores of masculinity were not normally distributed a non-
parametric Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff test was conducted rejecting the hypothesis that both sam-
                                               
22 While the BSRI was originally used to provide information about the self, it served to gain knowledge on how
a particular other is perceived in the present study.  Devlin (1997) adopted the test for the same purpose.20
ples are drawn from the same population at the 1 ‰ level.)
23 Comparing the scores of all three
candidates on social desirability we find that we can not reject the hypothesis of equal means
at the 5 % significance level.
24
male masculine female feminine female
Masculinity   mean --- 5.37 4.3
                       sd (0.56) (0.99)
                       n 40 34
Femininity      mean --- 3.84 4.47
                       sd (0.8) (0.71)
                       n 40 34
Social            mean 4.75 4.57 4.54
Desirability   sd (0.65) (0.63) (0.57)
                       n 45 40 34
Table 3: mean from 7-point scale, standard deviation and number of observations for the different dimen-
sions of the BSRI for all three job-candidates.
3.2.3 Occupations
 
 The occupations investigated in this study where those for which a high enough labor demand
existed so that a sufficient amount of standardized applications could be sent out in response
to job advertisements. The possibility to create convincing application material (e.g. by pro-
viding school-reports) and to submit written applications (in many occupations phone calls
are required to test the verbal fluency of applicants) further reduced the range of testable oc-
cupations.
 The jobs of network-technician, computer programmer, accountant and secretary ful-
filled all these requirements and allowed us to test two traditionally masculine and two femi-
                                               
23 The values of femininity and masculinity are not reported for the man, since it seems unclear how to interpret
them for different sexes. To be equally assertive might be considered more striking on a women and therefore
lead to higher scores. In fact the masculine woman received significantly higher scores in masculinity and sig-
nificantly lower ones in femininity than the man. This means for the experiment to be on “the safe side”: If the
masculine woman is treated more unfavorable than the male in masculine jobs it can not be due to a lack of mas-
culinity!
24 man - masculine female: t = - 1,426; t(83;5%) = - 1,666
man - feminine female: t = -1.243; t(77;5%) = - 1,667
masculine - feminine female: t = 0,631; t(72;5 %) = 1,66821
nine jobs. Table 4 presents the sex distribution, rate of unemployment and average income of
the occupations contained in this study.
 







 average income in
Austrian Schillings
 network-technician  13 %  2 %  23,312
 Masculine occupations
 computer programmer  13 %  2 %  23,312
 accountant  77 %  4.3 %  15,254
 Feminine occupations
 secretary  97 %  6.2 %  15,605
Table 4: Female representation (Source: Austrian Census 1991), unemployment rate and average income
of tested occupations in the Austrian labor force calculated from Austrian Micro-Census 1997. The occu-
pations network-technician and computer programmer were not classified separately in the census, but
constitute one subcategory of „computer-technicians”.
3.2.4 Sending out the applications
From early 1998 to fall 1999 the Saturday issue of  the Austrian newspaper „Kurier“ was ex-
amined weekly for relevant job-announcements. The „Kurier“ is the central source for job-
advertisements in the Greater Vienna area and beyond, which is the largest Austrian labor
market. Applications of all three candidates were sent out to all vacancies that invited written
applications, except those where the selection process was carried out through a personnel
recruitment agency.
25  Enterprises advertising jobs repeatedly were contacted only once to
avoid detection. For the same reason the applications of the three different applicants that
were sent to one firm, were posted on different days of the week (Fr., Mo., Tue.), rotating
whose application was sent out first and last to avoid any systematic error.
If an entrepreneur was interested in one of the applicants, he or she could be contacted
either through a Viennese address, or by leaving a message on an answering machine. When
one of the applicants was invited to an interview, the proposed appointment was canceled to
avoid any inconveniences on the firm’s side. 
26
                                               
25 Recruitment agencies distribute their applicants to a number of different employers which does not allow to
assign their response to one identifiable vacant position.
26 Correspondence Testing does impose some costs on the employer as the resumés of applicants who are actu-
ally not available have to be evaluated, but – as Riach and Rich (1995, p. 347) have put it – these costs are “... in
a manner which is not infrequent in the labor market, as participants carry out the process of search and acqui-22
4 Results
4.1 Unequal treatment in job offers
First, the experimentally gained data is presented to give a systematic comparison of the suc-
cess-rates of different applicants (m = male,   mf = masculine female, ff = feminine female)
for the different tested occupations.
4.1.1 Masculine occupations
When gendered characteristics matter and masculine traits are beneficial in masculine occu-
pations, then absent of discrimination the masculine female, who proves to obtain the classic
masculine characteristics, should be treated like the male applicant. On the other hand, the
feminine female should fare less successfully since she does not provide these required traits.
Her unfavorable treatment would be based on a profit-maximizing decision and could not be
assigned to discrimination. Consequently, when personality matters and there is no discrimi-
nation, we expect our applicants to be treated according the following order: m = mf > ff. Dif-
ferent results either imply, that personality traits are not relevant (when all people are treated
the same: m = mf = ff), or that real discrimination exists (when the male and masculine fe-
male are treated differently: m „ mf).
In the case of network technicians the man proved to be the most successful, followed
by the masculine female and the feminine female. From the 117 enterprises tested, 73 % con-
tacted the male applicant, 63 % the masculine female and 58 % the feminine female for an
interview.
The results are set out in Table 5, which allows for a pairwise comparison of appli-
cants for every occupation tested. The top line of each job category always compares the re-
sults of the male applicant with those of the masculine female, the second line the male with
the feminine female and the bottom line the masculine with the feminine female.
                                                                                                                                                  
sition of bargaining chips to negotiate with current and prospective employers.” For a more exhaustive discus-
sion on the ethical question of deception in social research see Riach/Rich (1991a) and Goode (1996).23






























  m – mf 20.51% 56.41% 16.24% 6.84% 9.40% 4.48 *

















































































Table 5: Results of Correspondence Testing for all occupations.
Where there is one degree of freedom, the critical value of chi squared at the 5 % level of significance is 3.84 (at
the 1 % level c
2 = 6.63). One star (*) denotes that one person is treated unfavorably more often than the other at
the 5 % level, two stars (**) at the 1 % level.
                                               
27 This data contains 16 observations of firms anonymously advertising by use of a chiffre-number. Since these
did not allow to associate the invitation for an interview with job requirements given in the ad, they have been
rejected for further analysis. Interestingly, anonymous employers show no significantly different behavior, al-
though their hidden identity would allow them to discriminate at lower costs.24
Looking at the results for network technicians and comparing column 4 and 5 in Table
5 we find, that the second person is always treated unfavorably more often than the first which
leaves us with a positive net-discrimination against the second person. Nevertheless this dif-
ference is only significant when comparing the man with the women – but not when compar-
ing the two women with each other. Although the masculine female appears somewhat more
successful than the feminine (she suffers a lower net-discrimination in comparison to the
male), the hypothesis that the two women are treated the same cannot be rejected (see line 3).
This implies, the applicants have been treated in the following order: m > mf = ff.
In the occupational group of programmers, applicants in general turned out over-
whelmingly successful. With a probability of more than 80 % an applicant was invited to a
job interview, which means that our candidates were considered sufficiently attractive for
almost any job-opening. Out of a number of 88 firms 81 % contacted the male, 85 % the mas-
culine female and 81 % the feminine female for an interview. Even a systematic reduction of
the applicants’ human capital (from a high to a poor university degree to eventually holding a
moderate high school degree only) did not cause any change in employers’ behavior. No dif-
ferences in treatment have been observed, all applicants have been doing equally well:
m = mf = ff.
 The reason for this high general acceptance is to be found in the extremely tight labor
market in this occupation, caused besides others by Y2K. While with an excess supply of
workers a taste for discrimination is not punished by lower profits – for each female applicant
an equally qualified male is available –, profit-maximizing is more binding in a tight labor
market: When employees are scarce there is no room for being choosy in terms of gender if a
certain productivity is being guaranteed! This observation is compatible with the predictions




Under the assumption that feminine characteristics are particularly productive in traditionally
female occupations, we argued, the feminine female should receive favorable treatment in the
absence of discrimination, since she has identical human capital but scores highest in femi-
nine traits. The masculine female as well as the male applicant should fare less successful,
since they lack these required characteristics. Consequently we expect the following order: m
= mf < ff.25
Equal treatment of all candidates (m = mf = ff) would suggest, that personality does
not matter in the occupation under investigation, differential treatment of the male and mas-
culine female (m „ mf) indicates the existence of a taste for discrimination.
For accountants we find no evidence for differential treatment. In total 149 firms were
contacted, out of which 43 % got in touch with the feminine female, while an equal percent-
age of 40 % were interested in meeting the male and the masculine female applicant respec-
tively. Even though the feminine women was slightly more successful than her competitors,
the hypothesis of equal treatment could not be rejected and hence, statistically, all applicants
have been treated the same: m = mf = ff.
The most severe unequal treatment is found in the occupation of secretaries. Out of
123 firms contacted, the masculine female was invited by 46 % of all employers followed by
the feminine female with  44 %. The male applicant was clearly defeated with a success-rate
of only 20 %. From Table 5 can be seen that the male was treated unfavorably significantly
more often than the females at the 1 % level. In 32 % (30 %) of all cases he was not invited
for an interview while the masculine (feminine) female was. On the other hand he only re-
ceived beneficial treatment in 6 % (7 %), where he was invited but his female competitor was
not. At the same time the hypothesis that the two women with differing gender identity re-
ceived equal treatment, could not be rejected: m < mf = ff.
The question of this paper is whether it is perceived differences in personality traits
that drives women’s labor market outcomes relative to men’s. Our experiment allows to com-
pare the hiring chances of a man and woman, who are matched not only in human capital but
even in personality. If there is no discrimination, the masculine female should be treated like
the male in all cases, while the feminine female should receive preferential or unfavorable
treatment depending on the sex-type of the occupation.
Here we find the opposite to be true. Significant differential treatment was found in
the occupation of the network-technician and secretary – both times the two women were
treated the same, while the man was significantly more or less successful. This means that
differential treatment is not driven by gendered personality traits but solely by biological sex -
which is an indication that it is discrimination that we are observing. Our finding can not be
reconciled with statistical discrimination, since there was very detailed information on the
applicants, not only on human capital, but even personality.26
4.2 What determines differential treatment?
In the next step we tried to investigate, which factors determine the differential treatment of
applicants. It might be the case that in more prestigious positions women are discriminated
more severely or that they are considered as less suitable for jobs with particular require-
ments.
All the available information from the job-advertisements was coded in a number of
variables that captured requirements on human capital and personality traits and indicated,
whether the actual text of the ad was addressed to women or men specifically instead of being
formulated in a sex-neutral way. Note that in German, contrary to English language, the sex
of a job holder is usually explicit by sex-specific formulation (as in actor/actress).
The following information was extracted from those job-advertisements to which ap-
plications were submitted and captured mostly by dummy-variables:
1. Required human capital: special knowledge, experience, literacy in English, other qualifi-
cations;
2. Required personality traits: young and flexible, sociable, independent, powerful and dy-
namic, friendly and correct, other characteristics;
3. Characteristics of advertisement/job: occupation, job-prestige (combination of job-
hierarchy and size of advertisement), required attachment of photograph;
4. Sex-specification of advertisement: sex-neutral, female, male formulated job announce-
ment.
The number of firms advertising sex specifically is surprisingly large considering the equal
treatment law from 1990 (BGBl.Nr. 108/1979, modified by BGBl.Nr. 410/1990) that de-
mands sex-neutral advertising of vacancies and prohibits signaling – even implicitly - any
preference for a certain sex.  Nevertheless only 62 % of the advertisements investigated are in
accordance with the law as Table 6 demonstrates.
28
                                               
28 These numbers take into account not only the sex specific formulation of the job title in the advertisement but
also rather rare implicit signals for a desired applicant’s sex. E.g. having to be „very attractive and good-
looking“ was classified as implicitly searching for a female applicant, advertising sex-neutral but adding „look-








Feminine occupation 62 % 33 % 5 %
Masculine occupation 61 % 0 % 39 %
Table 6: Proportion of gender-neutral and sex-specific formulations of job-advertisements in feminine and
masculine occupations.
As expected, the sex-type of a job strongly determines at which sex job-advertisements are
directed: 33 % of the advertisements in feminine occupations are ex- or implicitly aimed at
women, 39 % in masculine occupations at men.
As in the previous chapter we now compare the results of two candidates, but addi-
tionally all the variables on job requirements find consideration. To estimate the impact of
these variables on the relative success-rate of two applicants we ran an ordered probit regres-
sion of the following type:
yi = a xi  + ei , (4.1)
where the outcome yi is a dummy variable that analyzes the relative success of a candidate in
comparison to another, xi is a vector of control variables and a the corresponding vector of
coefficients to be estimated. ei is an error term that is assumed to satisfy the usual assump-
tions.
The dependent variable was coded as follows:
2 ... the first person was preferred to the second
1 ... both received equal treatment
0 ... the second received preferential treatment
Consequently a positive coefficient works as an advantage for the first candidate.
Table 7 shows the results for all occupations, since they do not vary with respect to
profession. Column 1 presents the pairwise comparison of male and masculine female, col-
umn 2 male and feminine female and column 3 masculine female and feminine female.
As can be seen, solely the “required sex” indicated by sex-specific formulation of a job
announcement determines differential treatment – with the single exception of job prestige.
Interestingly, neither requirements on human capital nor personality can explain different la-28
bor market outcomes, even though the feminine female was perceived to obtain other person-
ality traits than the others.
The variables capturing the sex-specific formulation of an ad clearly have the strongest
impact on differential treatment. If an advertisement is using a male instead of a sex-neutral
term for a vacant position, this increases the male’s chances in comparison to the females’,
while a female term leads to a preferential treatment of women to that of men. Nevertheless
these two dummy-variables have no significant impact on differential treatment of the two
women with differing gender identities.
This result indicates that sex-specific terminology is not used coincidentally in job-
advertisements.
29 If the male form is used, an actually male applicant is looked for, while a
female form implies that a female employee is wanted. Thus the common argument that male
terminology is used for convenience only (not intending to exclude females), is not supported
here.
Nevertheless there is an interesting effect of a female’s “manliness” observable: While
in column 2 there is a symmetric effect observable for the male and feminine female, when
they are applying for a sex-term incongruent position
30, the coefficient for a male job-term
explaining the differential treatment of the male and masculine female is not only considera-
bly smaller, but also significant only at the  10 % level.
31 This indicates that a male job-term
does not lead to an equally strong unfavorable treatment of the masculine female than the
feminine female in comparison to the male, even if we find no significant impact comparing
the masculine with the feminine female (column 3).
From this can be concluded that signaling manliness does not decrease women’s
chances in a female specified vacancy, but it might slightly reduce unfavorable treatment in a
male-termed job.
                                               
29 Often employers and opponents of a German sex-neutral language argue that the male form of a job term does
not intend to exclude women but is rather a historically grown general term including „all people“.
30 As the positive coefficient for „job-term male“ in column 2 (m – ff) suggests, a male job-term works equally
strong in favor of the male compared to the feminine female, a „job-term female“ in column 1 and 2 works
against him, no matter whether he competes against a feminine or masculine female (column 1).
31 This reminds of the results for network-technicians (Table 7), where we have found that masculinity slightly
reduces the level of significance of differential treatment.29
            male vs. masculine           male vs. feminine         masculine vs. feminine
                          female                              female                              female
knowledge    -0.047       -0.086  -0.055
           (0.161)      (0.158)   (0.172)
experience   0.131       0.059  -0.084
           (0.109)      (0.107)   (0.117)
English    0.124       0.043  -0.092
           (0.139)      (0.137)   (0.150)
other   0.181      0.001  -0.202
qualifications      (0.146)      (0.145)   (0.153)
young/  -0.076       0.008  0.098
flexible  (0.117)      (0.114)   (0.123)
sociable      0.049       0.022  -0.026
           (0.101)      (0.100)   (0.108)
independent     0.006       0.026  0.024
(0.096)      (0.094)   (0.102)
powerful/       -0.159       -0.118  0.045
dynamic           (0.097)      (0.096)   (0.103)
nice/good  0.018      -0.031  -0.064
(friendly/correct)  (0.108)      (0.105)   (0.115)
other personality      -0.111       -0.153  -0.078
traits           (0.217)      (0.215)   (0.234)
job-prestige      -0.037*      -0.021  0.017
           (0.018)      (0.018)   (0.020)
photo       -0.014       -0.119  -0.147
           (0.167)      (0.164)   (0.179)
job-term   0.254~       0.423**  0.241
male  (0.151)      (0.150)   (0.160)
job-term -0.433**       -0.432**  -0.029
female (0.161)      (0.159)   (0.171)
Pseudo R-sq   0.035        0.036  0.016
# obs :                462        462             462
Table 7: Pairwise comparison of invitation probability
Ordered Probit Estimation: All Occupations (standard errors in parentheses with p<0.10 = ~, p<0.05 = *,
p<0.01 = **)
Required human capital: knowledge=[0,1], job specific knowledge required: no,  yes; experience=[0,1,2], job experience required: no, yes:
£ 5 years, >5years; English=[0,1,2], English required: no, yes, fluent; otherqual: number of other required job qualifications.
Required personality traits (number of all required traits fitting into one category):
young/flexible: young, flexible, swift; sociable: sociable; independent: independent, sense of responsibility; power: committed, dedicated,
self-initiative, innovative, ambitious, self-confident, dynamic, motivated; nice/good: friendly, correct, exact, reliable, loyal, sense of style,
neat appearance; other characteristics:  e.g. non-smoker.
Characteristics of advertisement/job: jobsize=jobhierarchy*size of advertisement; photo=[0,1], attachment of photograph required: no,
yes; job-term male=[0,1], job-term female=[0,1], base: neutral job-term.30
The small but significant effect of the variable job-prestige when comparing the male with the
masculine female is rather unexpected. As pointed out before, this variable captures the hier-
archy of the job and the advertisement size (through multiplication of the two). The reason for
paying attention to ad size is the following: The more financial resources are available (lead-
ing to higher pay) and the more important a position is, the more willing an employer will be
to spend money on a larger ad. So the size of an advertisement might be used in addition to
hierarchy of a job as an indicator for the importance of a position. The negative coefficient
means, that the more prestigious a job, the worse are the chances of the male relatively to the
masculine female.
A possible interpretation of this might be that the masculine female represents a
much more unconventional, almost exotic, type of personality, while still fulfilling the others’
standards of beauty etc. A more prestigious position might allow for a more unconventional
behavior and personal individuality - it might even be considered an integral part of a leader-
ship personality, while it is sanctioned at a low status job. This might lead to the result that the
more sophisticated masculine female has a relative advantage in more high-ranked positions
in comparison to the traditional male.
5 Conclusions
Previous studies trying to measure discrimination could not satisfactorily prove that the ob-
served differential treatment of men and women was actually due to discrimination and not to
personal characteristics that have not been controlled for. Econometric studies but also labor
market experiments have failed to consider one aspect, that might determine productivity
(apart from human capital) the most: individual personality. Sex-segregation in the labor mar-
ket could be driven by the requirement to obtain matching personality traits (masculine traits
in male occupations, feminine in female jobs), when hiring decisions are made under uncer-
tainty drawing on sex-stereotypes.
This study adopted an experimental technique called Correspondence Testing to ex-
amine whether it is presumed differences in personality traits of men and women that lead to
different labor market outcomes. Using this methodology in a country like Austria, where
very detailed application material is required, offers one big advantage: Detailed information
on human capital minimizes the possibility of statistical discrimination concerning individu-31
als’ qualifications for a job. Furthermore, strong signals were given to indicate different per-
sonalities of applicants.
If differential treatment of the sexes in earlier studies was due to statistical discrimina-
tion, we argue, it should disappear in the setting of this experiment, where a maximum of
variables is controlled for. When it is personality that leads to different labor market outcomes
of men and women, then in the absence of discrimination an identically qualified male and
female with observable, equally masculine personality traits should be treated the same, while
a more feminine person should receive preferential treatment in feminine occupations and
unfavorable treatment in masculine occupations.
We observed the contrary: Equal treatment of the two women and different treatment
of the man, indicating that it is biological sex and not productivity relevant personality that is
driving labor market segregation. Unfavorable treatment in masculine occupations is not sig-
nificantly reduced when a woman provides a masculine identity. Similarly preferential treat-
ment in feminine occupations is not threatened by “manliness”.
Even though there are minor indicators that masculinity might slightly reduce unfavor-
able treatment in some cases, the unexplained residual of differential treatment remains - even
after controlling for personality traits. This suggests that it is not different productivity, not
different personality, but discrimination that leads to differential treatment and sex-
segregation at the workplace.32
6 Appendix: Indicators for gender identity
 
Name: Patricia  Name: Patricia Vorbach Vorbach
My Hobbies: Drawing, designing and
making of clothes
Stayed in Portland, USA, as an Au-Pair
for one and a half years
 
NAME: ALEXANDRA AUER
Hobbies: Sports (rock-climbing, canoe-
ing), playing drums, reading, motorcy-
cling
Motorcycle tour through Australia for
one and a half years (jobs in Perth, Alice
Springs, Melbourne, Darwin)
Name: Peter Englmair
Hobbies: Travelling, sport (jogging,
mountainbiking, wild-water-rafting),
music (guitar)
Travelled for one and a half years (Aus-
tralia, Hong-Kong, USA), various jobs33
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